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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. A. RUSSELL and lVIARTEL E.
RUSSELL,
vs.
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION, a corporation; THE .l\1AJORBLAKENE Y CORPORATION, a
corporation; and R 0 B E RT W.
MAJOR,
Defcndants-A ppcllant.

Case No.
12879

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION
OF CASE
Respondents instituted this proceeding in the form
of a Declaratory Relief Action wherein a determination
was sought that a certain Lease and Purchase Agreement dated the 31st day of :March, 1967, between Respondents and Appellants predecessor in interest was
terminated for the nonpayment of the 1970 annual
rental. The amount of $2,500.00 by way of liquidated
damages was also sought by Respondents.
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After the completion of preliminary discovery
proceedures, Respondents, pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure, moved the lower court
for Summary Judgment.
Appellant resisted Respon<lents' J\Iotion for Summary Judgment on the basic grounds that genuine
disputes existed as to material facts, that there had not
been a default on which to predicate a forfeiture, that
if there had been a forfeiture Appellant was entitled
to equitable relief therefrom, and, further, that Appellant had tendered the rent due to Respomlents prior to
the institution of the proceeding and Appellant was entitled to the restoration of its leasehold estate pursuant
to Section 78-36-1 Utah Code Anno., 1953 (As
amended) .
DISPOSITION OF LO\VER COURT
The lower court granted Respondents' l\Iotion for
Summary .Judgment terminating said Lease and Purchase Agreement and further awarded Respondents the
amount of $2,500.00 as liquidated <lamagcs. The action
was dismissed as to the clefendants Robert \V. l\Iajor
and the J\Iajor-Blakeney Corporation.
\Vi thin five days after the entry of said judgment,
Appellant for the second time tendered the rent due,
together with interest thereon and costs, to Respondents
by depositing the same with the Summit County Clerk's
Office. Thereafter, Appellant's l\1otion to Stay Execu-
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tion, :Motion for Reconsideration and a Petition and
Order to Show Cause why Respondents should not be
compelled to accept Appellant's tender were all denied
by the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Summary J udgment granted by the lower court and a remand of the
matter for trial; or, in the alternative, Appellant seeks
a reversal of the lower court's denial of Appellant's
Order to Show Cause and a determination by this Court
that Appellant is entitled to the restoration provisions
of Section 78-36-10 Utah Code Anno., 1953 (as amended).
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
On the 31st day of :March, 1967, Respondents and
Appellant's predecessor in interest executed a Lease and
Purchase Agreement (R. 37-44), hereinafter referred
to as the .l\Iaster Lease. Subsequently, Appellant's predecessor in interest entered into a Sublease of the same
leasehold property constituting 1,942 acres with Ski
Park City 'Vest, Inc., a Utah corporation, hereinafter
referred to as the Sublessee (R. 94-122). Both the
.Master Lease of l\Iarch 31, 1967, and the Sublease dated
July 31, 1967, were consumated in accordance with and
pursuant to a basic Agreement executed between Appellants' predecessor in interest and the predecessor in
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interest of the Sublessee dated January 24, 1967 (R.
144-155).
Since the execution of the Sublease on July 31,
1967, the sublessee has enjoyed continued and uninterupted possession of the entire 1942 acres constituting the leasehold property.
In November, l!lu7, Respondents were advised by
Appellant of the Sublease Agreement and Respondents
accepted the first annual rental payment due under the
l\Iaster Lease from the Sublessee (Deposition Exhibit
P-1). Appellant made the next two annual rental payments under the l\Iaster Lease.
The annual rental payments under the _l\Iaster
Lease due on the lst day of November of each year covered a rental period commencing _March 31 of that year
and confnuing through _l\Iarch 30 of the next succeeding year (R. 37).
In February, 1971, the Sublessee was instructed
hy Appellant to again make the annual rental payment
under the 1\Iaster Lease directly to Respondents, as
had been done previously with the first annual rental
payment. Suhlessee was further advised that its accounts payable to Appellant would be credited to the
extent of this payment (Deposition Exhibit P-5). At
this time, Sublessee owed amounts provided for under
the Agreements of January 24 and July 31, 1967, to
Appellant which exceeded the annual rental payment
under the 1\Iaster Lease (Deposition pp. 38-40) . By let-
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ter dated .March 3, 1971, Respondents were advised of
this payment procedure (Deposition Exhibit P-6).
On :March 9, 1971, Appellant was advised by Sublessee's attorney, :Mr. Arthur II. Nielsen, that Sublessee would not partially satisfy its obligation to Appellant by making the annual rental payment under
the l\1aster Lease directly to Respondents (Deposition
Exhibit P-7). Significantly, l\fr. Nielsen also represented Respondents and mailed a notice dated l\'Iarch
11, 1971, wherein a. forty-five ( 45) day deadline was
established within whjch Appellant was to make the
annual rental payment (Deposition Exhibit P-8). However, said notice was not actually received by Appellants
until after April 1, 1971 (Deposition pp. 57-60).
Respondents, through their attorney l\1r. Nielsen,
were advised by letter dated April 19, 1971, that the
annual rental payment would be made within such further time as reaso11able necessary following the expiration of the forty-five day period pursuant to Article
VIII of the l\Iaster Lease. l\Ir. Nielsen was further
advised on behalf of his other client, Appellants' Sublessee, that the default in the .Master Lease could be
cured by payment of the l\Iaster Lease rental obligation
by the Sublessee as provided in paragraph 15, subparagraph 3 of the Sublease Agreement of July 31,
1967 (Exhibit P-11 to Affidavit of E. A. Russell).
On l\Iay 4, 1971, eight days after the expiration of
the forty-five day period purportedly established by
Mr. Nielsen on l\'larch 11, 1971, Appellant was advised
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that the l\Iaster Lease provision relating to additional
time would not be recognized by Respondents and that
the l\Iaster Lease was terminated (Exhibit P-12 to Affidavit of E. A. Russell).
After Appellant finally determined that the Sublessee would not partially perform its obligations to Appellant by satisfyi11g the annual rental payment due
under the l\laster Lease, the full amount of said rent,
$4,855.18, was tendered to Respondents by Appellant
on June 7, 1971 (R. t>8). This tender was refused by
Respondents on June 15, 1971 (Exhibit P-13 to Affidavit of E. A. Russell).
Service of process on Appellant in this matter was
made oi1 .June 25, 1971, and, on July 1, 1971, Hespondents entered into a new Lease Agreement covering
the identical 1,942 acres encompassed by the .Master
Lease and the Sublease with a corporation known as
Life Resources, Inc. (R. 155-161). Life Resources,
Inc., owns eighty percent of the stock of Ski Park City
\Vest, Inc., Appellant's Sublessee.
Respondents and representatives of Sublessee and
Life Resources, Inc., ·were in personal contact with each
other, unknown to Appellant, as early as .l\f arch, 1971
(Deposition pp. 70-71). The concerted efforts of the
Sublessee, Life Resources. Inc. and Respondents to
frustrate the l\Iaster Lease are established by the following, hut not inclusive, facts: The contact between
the representatives of the Suhlessee and Life Resources,
Inc., and Respondents as early as
1971 (Deposi-
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tion pp. 70-71; R. 162-163); the common counsel
shared by Suhlessee and Respondents as evidenced by
the letters dated :March 9 and :March 11, 1971 ( deposition :Exhibits P-7 and P-8) ; the unjustified refusal of
Sublessee to partially satisfy its obligations to Appellant by paying the annual rental payment due under
the l\Iaster Lease (Deposition Exhibits P-5 and P-7);
and, the fact that on July 1, 1971, Respondents entere<l into another Lease and Purchase Agreement ( R.
155-161) encompassing the exact acreage as originally
coYered by the l\Iaster Lease and Sublease with the corporation that owns eighty percent of the stock of Appellant's Sublessee, wherein the rental payment to Respondents was increased from $2.50 per acre or $4,855.18
annually under the l\laster Lease to $3.00 per acre or
$5,826.21 annually under the lease with Life Resources,
Inc., and the rental obligation of Appellant's Sublessee, who has continued in uninterupted possession of
said property from July 31, 1967 to the present, was
reduced to $3.00 per acre from a minimum rental of
$4.00 per acre or $7,768.28 annually plus an added percentage of gross receipts per annum, under the Sublease with Appellant.
In consideration for their execution of the Agreement dated July 1, 1971 (R. 155-161), Respondents
received and accepted the amount of $5,826.21 as the
first rental payment.
In addition to tendering the full rental payment
of $4,855.18 on June 7, 1971, Appellant made an addi-
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tional tender of the full mnount of the rental together
with interest thereon and Respondents' costs, for a total
of $5,319.00, to the Summit County Clerk's Office
with;n five <lays after the entry of the Summary J udgrnent (R. 128-129). This payment was not accepted by
Respondents and the court denied Appellant's Petition
and Order to Show Cause (R. 140-141, 136) to compel Respondents to accept the tender and restore Appellant to its leasehold estate under the l\iaster Lease of
_March 31, 1967.
ARGUl\iENT
POINT 1.

THE LO\iVER COURT ERRED IN
GRANT I NG RESPONDENTS' 1\10'l'ION FOR
JUDGl\lENT
llECAUSE THERE
GENUINE DISPUTES AS TO J\IATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT AND TI1E
l\IAY l3E RESOLVED ONLY 13 Y A
FULL AND COl\IPLETE TRIAL ON
TIIE _MERITS.
As stated by this Court in Bullock vs. Deseret
Dodge Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960),
at 11 Utah 2d 4, 5:
"A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions and inferences
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which when viewed in the light most favorable
to the loser show that, 'There is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.' Such showing must preclude all
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if
given a trial, produce evidence which would
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."
Article VIII of the l\Iaster Lease provides, in
part:

"No default of lessee in any of the provisions hereof shall constitute a basis for forf ei lure of this lease unless the same shall continue for more than forty-five (45) days
after written notice to lessee specifying of
what the default consists, and in the event
lessee fails to correct said def ault within such
further time as is reasonably necessary to cure
the same, lessee shall quit and surrender the
premises to lessors subject to the reservation
eontained in paragraph II abm'e. * * *" (Emphasis added) .

By the clear language of the l\Iaster Lease, a default in any of the lease provisions, including the provisions for the payment of rent, may not constitute a
basis for forfeiture unless the same continues for more
than a reasonable time beyond the expiration of the
forty-five day written notice period. A determination
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of what constitutes reasonable additional time presents
an immediate question of fact, particularily in light of
Respondents' acts and conduct. To avoid repetition,
Respondents' objectionable conduct will be specified in
the following portions of this brief.
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court has
never sanctioned a procedure of trial by affidavit and
it is apparent that AppeJlant could produce evidence,
if given a trial, that would preclude Respondents from
terminating the .Master Lease.

POINT 2.
THE LOVVER COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED TlIE LA'V TO TIIOSE
FACTS PRESENTED BY TI-IE INSTANT .MATTER NOT IN DISPUTE.
A.

TIIERE 'VAS XO DEFAULT BY
APPELLANT ON \VHICII TO
PREDICATE A FORFEITURE OF
THE l\lASTER LEASE.

The purported notice of l\Iarch 11, 1971, was ineffective to commence a time within which payment of
the annual rent was to be made to avoid a forfeiture.
As stated in 40 Am J ur 2d, Landlord aud 'J.lcnant, Section 1087, p. 10-!7," (The Notice) * * * must comply
with the requirements of the lease and the law respecting the time allowed for payment." The subject notice
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completely ignored any additional time beyond a fortyfive day period contrary to the language of the Master
I ,ease. Therefore, Appellant never received adequate
notice which commenced the time within which a defa ult
would have to he rectified.
Respondents' pronounced termination of the
l\Iaster Lease on .l\Iav 4, 1971, was ineffective because
a default had not continued beyond the grace period
provided for in Article VIII of the .l\Iaster Lease. Appellant contends that it did not receive the notice of
l\Iarch 11, 1971, until after April 1st of the same year.
In this event, the forty-five day period had not yet expired. Even if Appellant had received the notice on
12, 1971, the day after the date the notice bears,
such a<lditional time as was reasonably necessary to cure
the default had not yet expired.
The termination of l\Iay 4, 1971, was effective only
to render further action by Appellant useless and
futile. This Court stated in Utah II otcl Company vs.
11/adscn, 4a Utah 285, 134 P. 577 ( 1913), at 43 Utah
301:
"But, entirely apart from all authority,
how often must it be decided that where it
appears, as in this case, that a tender would
have been wholly useless no tender is necessary?
"\Vhile there are a few sporatic cases, perhaps,
that in particular cases have departed from
the general principal, yet the great weight of
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authority is to the effect that where the evidence without conflict shows, or where it is
found, that a tender would have been useless,
none is required to be either alleged or proved."
The futility of further action by the Appellant
after .l\Iay 4, 1971, is substantiated by the fact that
Appellant's tender of the full rental amount of
on June 7, 1971, was immediately rejected
by Respondents.

B.

SIIOULD IT BE DETER.1\IINED
THAT THERE 'VAS A DEF AULT
BY APPELLANT ON lVI-IICH TO
PREDICATE A FORFEITURE,
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
EQUITABLE RELIEF FR 0
TIIE FOHFEITURE.

The }\Jaster Lease was for a term of ten years
commencing the 31st day of J\Iarch, 1967, and ending
on the 31st day of J\Iarch, 1977 (R. 37). After three
annual payments had been made, the circumstances
gi,·ing rise to the instant proceeding occured. The only
basis on which Respondents sought a termination of the
l\Iaster Lease was the alleged default in the annual
rental payment for the period of l\Iarch 31, 1970 to
l\Iarch 30, 1971.
A contractual provision for forfeiture is looked
upon with disfavor and strictly construed against the
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party seeking to invoke the forfeiture. In a lease agreement, a forfeiture provision is considered security for
the payment of relit and equity will offer relief against
a forfeiture upon the payment by the lessee of the principal and i11terest. 31 ALR 2d, Anno., Lease-Forfeiture-ll elicf (1953). The tender justifies relief because
the purpose of forfeiture is served.
Prior to the purported notice of .March 11, 1971,
Appellant assigned a portion of its accounts receivable
from its Snblessec to Respondents. Curiously, the first
objection to the assignment came from the debtor-Sublessee in a letter from its attorney dated l\Iarch 9, 1971.
Two <lays later, the same attorney, now representing
Respondents, submitted to Appellant the inadequate
notice of l\Iareh 11, 1971. The assignment as a method
of payment was defeated by and through the collusion
of Respondents and Appellant's debtor-Sublessee. Even
before any time period within which to cure a default
as provided for in the l\Iaster Lease had been comrnenee<l, Respondents were in negotiation with Appellant's Suhlessee for the betterment of their own position without any intention of permitting Appellant to
pursue the rights provided for in the l\Iaster Lease.
In light of the total circumstances, including both
Appellant's good faith efforts to remedy any default
and Respondents acts and conduct intended to frustrate
any course pursued by Appellant, equitable relief from
termination of the l\Iaster Lease should be afforded Appellant.
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C.

APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
TI-IE REDEl\IPTION AND RESTORATION PROVISIONS OF
SECTIONS 78-36-10 UTAII CODE
ANNO. 1953 (AS Al\IENDED).

After judgment has been entered against a defaulting tenant, Section 78-36-10 Utah Code Anno.
1953 (As amended) provides:
"'Vhen the proceeding is for an unlawful
detainer after default in the payment of the
rent, and a lease or agreement under 'l.ohich the
rent is payable has not by its terms etcpired,
execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the expiration of five days after the
entry of the judgment, within which time the
tenant or any sub-tenant, or any mortgagee of
the term, or other par(l/ interested in its continuance, may pay into court for the landlord
the amount of the judgment and costs, and
thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied, and
the tenant shall be restored to his estate; but
if payment as herein provided is not made
within the five days, the judgment may be enforced for its full amount, and for the possession of the premises. In all other cases the
judgment may be enforced immediately."
(Emphasis added.)
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As previously noted, the
Lease had several
years remaining as an unexpired term and Respondents'
action was predicated solely on the purported default
in the annual rental payment for the period
31,
1970 through
30, 1971. Also, in addition to the
tender of .June 7, 1971, the full amount of the annual
rental payment, together with interest thereon and Respondents' costs, was deposited with the Smnmit County
Clerk's Office on the 20th day of
1971 (R. 128129).
Appellant submits that the execution of a sublease
does not effect the lessee's right of possession as against
the master lessor. To accomplish a termination of the
lessee's constructive possession, a lessor is required to
give a three day notice to pay or quit the premises. The
only additional requirement brought about by the existence of a sublease is that the subtenant must be
made a party defendant. Section 78-36-7 Utah Code
Anno., 1953 (as amended).
Should the lessee or subtenant remain in possession
after the appropriate notice, either or both would be
subject to unlawful detainer proceedings. However,
the lessee or the subtenant would then be entitled to
invoke the five day redemption and restoration privilege
set forth in Section 78-36-10 Utah Code Anno., 1953
(as amended) .
This Court recognized the restoration provision of
78-36-10 Utah Code Anno., 1953 (as amended) in Commercial Block Realty Co. vs. Dlerchants' Protective
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Ass'n., 71 Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 ( 1928), where a
tenant was not required to tender delinquent rent to
preserve his lease. This Court stated at 71 Utah 509:
"Ile (tenant) may await the judicial determination of the amount of rent, and after
judgment pay the rent and costs and be restored to his estate."
This privilege was characterized as a "safeguard"
to the tenant. This same "safeguard" should apply
where, as in the instant case, the proper rental amount
·was tendered to Respondents both before and after
judgment.
In an effort to circumvent the restoration "safeguard", Respondents elected to bring an action in the
nature of a Declaratory
proceeding. IIowe,·er, the lower court should have recognized that Respondents' action was "in the nature" of an unlawful
detainer proceeding.
See Gra,lj vs. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251
( 1943), wherein the lower court had dismissed defendants' counterclaims and excluded evidence thereon
because the complaint sought a declaratory judgment
quieting title to certain lands to plaintiff. This Court
reversed because the action was "in effect" an action to
quiet title and defendants were allowed to plead and
present evidence on their counterclaims. \Vhile the instant complaint is in the form of a declaratory termination of the l\iaster Lease, it should be recognized, "in
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effect", as a summary eviction proceeding entitling Appellant to the restoration privilege of 78-36-10 Utah
Code Anno., 195:3 (as amended).
The similarity in nature between an unlawful detainer action and an attempted termination of a lease in
a declaratory judgment proceeding requires equal treatment of applicable statutes and rules of law. In Telegraph At cn11c Corporation vs. Raentsch, 269 P. 109
(Sup.Ct., Calif., 1928), the Court, in considering the
California Statute comparable to Section 78-36-10 Utah
Code Anno., 195:1 (as amended), characterized the payment after judgment and restoration provisions as,
"* * * A privilege granted to every defendant brought
in under proceedings of this nature, and it is a substantial right of which he cannot be deprived by any action
of the trial court."
1

A further consideration is that a post judgment
payment may he made by any party interested in the
continuance of the subject lease. In this instance, Respondents were paid the amount of $5,826.21 on July
1, 1971, by the corporation owning 80 percent of the
stock of Appellant's Sublessee. This payment should
be construed as a satisfaction of the delinquent rental
amount entitling Appellant to restoration of the Master
Lease.
D.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
A'VARDING THE Al\lOUNT OF
$2,500.00 AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
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The record is completely devoid of any evidence
that the amount of $2,500.00 is reasonably related to
the actual damages sustained by Respondents. It is
clear that a party may recover contractual amounts
designated as liquidated damages only after a showing
that the amount so designated is reasonably related to
the actual damages resulting from the breach. Otherwise, such a provision, even if labeled "Liquidated
Damages" by the parties, will be considered an illegal
and unenforceable penalty.
This Court is committed to the rule that liquidated
damages will be enforced, "if the amount stipulated is
not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained."
Bram•u:ell Inv. Co. t 1s. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P. 2d
913 (1932), at 81 Utah 92.
In Perkins et al vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P. 2d 446 (l!M2), this Court stated at 121 Utah 475:

" ** *

where enforcement of the forf eiture provision would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recovery, bearing 110 reallonable relationship to the actual damage suff cred, we have uniformly held it to be unenforceable." (Emphasis added)
The facts clearly show that on July 1, 1971, less
than two months after the purported termination of the
l\Iaster Lease on _May 4, 1971, Respondents actually
received an additional $971.03 per year for the exact
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acreage inclu<led in the l\iaster Lease by virtue of the
execution of the lease with Life Resources, Inc.
Uather than showing the required reasonable relationship between the stipulated amount and actual
damages, the evidence clearly establishes that Respondents did not sustain any actual damages. The
lower courts award of $2,500.00 should be reversed.

E.

TlIE GRANTING OF RESPONDENTS' :l\IOTION F' 0 R SUl\11\IARY JUDGl\JENT DESTROYS
SEVERABLE AND DISTINCT
PRIVILEGES INNURING TO APPELLANT THAT DO NOT EXPIRE UNTIL l\LARCH 31, 1977.

The Master Lease contains provisions relating to
an Option to Purchase and Right of First Refusal that
are supported hy independent consideration. In 49 Am
J ur 2d, Landlord and '11enant, Section 385, at 403, it is
stated:
"The determination of whether a breach
of the lease by the lessee renders an option to
purchase nugatory depends on whether the
option and lease are one agreement or are independant. This resolves itself into a problem
of construction of the instrument and of determining the intent of the parties."
The lower court, without the benefit of any evidence relating to the independant consideration or in-
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tent of the parties with respect to the Option to Purchase and Right of First Ref us al summarily destroyed
said rights. The lower court did so without considering
that independant equities may afford relief from termination of such options notwithstanding dependencies
of other covenants with the option. 10 ALR 2d Anno.,
Tenants Option to Purchase, Section 9, p. 894 ( 1950).
The Option to Purchase and Right of First Refusal may not be taken from Appellant without a full
hearing on the merits.
SU.1\:Il\1ARY
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower
court efred and the matter should be reversed and remanded for a full trial on the merits; or, in the alternative, this court should determine that Appellant is entitled to the post judgment payment and restoration
privileges set forth in Section 78-36-10, Utah Code
Anno., 1953 (as amended).
Respectfully submitted:
RICHARDS & RICHARDS
Gary A. Frank

Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
900 'V alker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

